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Abstract This paper presents a model of labour supply determination under job
competition. In the presence of a positive rate of unemployment and increasing
returns to labour, the level of labour supply chosen by each individual lies above the
one that, at the offered wage, maximises utility. There is a unique strictly positive
degree of job competition that is consistent with the optimal allocation. If labour
supply is upward-sloping, increasing job competition raises the equilibrium level of
activity and, when job competition causes production to exceed its optimal level,
reducing output market competition leads to a welfare improvement.
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1 Introduction
Empirical evidence in industrialised countries has pointed to an increase in
individual labour supply over the past two-three decades. Bluestone and
Rose [6] note that, in the US, individual labour supply at each given real
wage has increased over the period 1982-1996 allowing the economy to ex-
pand without price inflation in spite of low levels of unemployment. Costa
[8] compares data on average hours worked per day in the 1890s, in 1973,
and in 1991 in the US. Workers are sorted into wage groupings, from the
lowest to the highest paid. It emerges that high earners reduce their time
spent at work between 1890 and 1973 but increase it in the following years.
A similar pattern for the UK has been highlighted by Green [12], who finds
that since 1981 ”greater proportions of men and women have been working
especially long hours” (Green [12], p. 61). Other studies have pointed out
that this increase in individual labour supply does not reflect workers’ prefer-
ences. In particular, a survey conducted by Bielenski et al. [4] and covering
16 European countries reveals that in all countries full-time employees would
prefer to work fewer hours. In other words, employees would like to trade
earnings for leisure. Further evidence in this sense can be found in Baaijens
and Schippers [3], Euwal and van Soest [11] and Hooker et al. [13].
The aim of this paper is to provide a model of labour supply that is consistent
with these stylised facts. The standard approach to labour supply determi-
nation predicts that, given the prevailing wage rate, individuals choose their
labour supply so as to maximise their utility function. By doing so, each
individual disregards other individuals’ behaviour since, in a perfectly com-
petitive labour market, all individuals looking for a job are certain to find
one without delay.
However, the persistence of positive level of unemployment suggests the exis-
tence of imperfections in the labour markets that prevent them from clearing.
Even the most competitive labour markets have some frictional unemploy-
ment. And, as long as economic cycles exist, each individual may expect to
spend part of their working life unemployed.
In this paper we account for the effect of labour market imperfections on in-
dividuals’ behaviour. In particular, we assume that each individual at each
point in time is either employed and working or unemployed and looking for
a job. The probability that a given employed worker j retains her job can be
affected by the behaviour of the worker herself. Specifically, this probability
is assumed to rise as labour supply of individual j increases relative to the
amount of labour supplied by all other individuals. This is justified by the
presence of increasing returns to labour. By this it is meant that, for any
individual worker, one of the following situations applies: (1) the worker’s
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marginal productivity increases with the amount of labour she supplies; (2)
the worker’s marginal productivity is constant but there are fixed costs of
employment (such as insurance, recruitment, training, etc.); (3) the worker’s
marginal productivity is decreasing but the fixed costs of employment are
so large that, for all admissible equilibria, the worker’s average productivity
increases with her labour supply. In all of these cases, firms strictly prefer
to employ long-hours working individuals and a worker who supplies more
labour than the average for any given real wage has a better than the aver-
age chance of keeping her job. In fact, if a firm decides to reduce the size
of its workforce, it will first lay-off the least productive workers. And these,
given increasing returns to labour, are the employees who supply the lowest
levels of labour. Hence, firms rank employees according to the level of labour
they supply. This gives rise to a rat race among individuals, each of them
trying to improve their ranking by supplying more labour than the other
individuals do. However, unlike in the original contribution of Akerlof [1],
or in more recent papers like the one by Sampson [16], the rat race does
not derive from workers’ desire to disclose/hide their unobservable charac-
teristics (signalling). In fact, all workers are identical. A rat race emerges
rather because individuals want to avoid to be laid-off as this entails being
temporarily unemployed1.
This job competition setting is nested into a general equilibrium framework
and discussed under both perfectly and imperfectly competitive product mar-
kets. The main results of the paper can be summarised as follows: (a) there
is a unique strictly positive degree of job competition consistent with the
socially optimal level of labour supply, (b) if labour supply is increasing in
wage, an increase (reduction) in job competition raises (lowers) the equilib-
rium level of activity; (c) a reduction in output market competition may lead
to a welfare improvement.
These results are related to different fields of the economic literature. As for
(a) and (b), analogous conclusions are derived in Moen [15]. In Moen’s paper
firms rank prospective employees according to the level of education because
more educated workers are more productive and there is rent sharing. This
creates a rat race where workers invest in education partly in order to achieve
a better ranking. It is shown that if there is little job competition workers
underinvest in education, while if there is too much job competition they
overinvest. Though in a different context, the same result emerges in this
paper. The main difference is that individuals instead of choosing investment
1Such a set up is particularly relevant for firms which have a policy of annual staff dis-
missals. According to Hudson and YouGov [14], such a policy has been used by Microsoft
and General Electric and more than three quarters of UK bosses think their companies
would benefit from its adoption.
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in education choose labour supply.
Result (c) is closely related to the literature on imperfectly competitive out-
put markets. The novel feature is that an increase in product market com-
petition may be detrimental. A result that is at odds with the general view
that competition is always beneficial (see Dixon and Rankin [9] and Silvestre
[17] for surveys and Blanchard and Giavazzi [5] and Ebell and Haefke [10] for
models of product-labour market interaction.). This finding is a consequence
of the fact that workers, by oversupplying labour, can cause production to
lie above its optimal level. If overproduction occurs, lowering competition
in the product market raises welfare as less competition implies less output.
The imperfect competition literature, by contrast, usually assumes that, if
employed, workers locate on their labour supply curve. Hence, overproduc-
tion never occurs so that reductions in output caused by a fall in competition
have always a negative impact on welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The model with in-
creasing returns to labour and no job competition is outlined in section 2.
Section 3 introduces job competition. Section 4 discusses the possible equi-
librium outcomes and the impact of an increase in job competition. Section
5 analyses the link between job competition and product market competi-
tion. Section 6 provides an example, while section 7 considers the case of a
backward-bending labour supply. Section 8 contains final comments.
2 Increasing returns, social optimum and mar-
ket outcome
We consider an economy in which, at each point in time, some workers are
laid-off and become unemployed, while other workers leave unemployment
and start a new job. Once a worker is made redundant, she begins searching
for a new job. After a certain time period, she finds work and becomes em-
ployed again. So, each individual at every point in time is in either one of
two states: employed or unemployed. The latter state occurs with probabil-
ity 1−, where  ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of the total workforce in employment
at each point in time.  is decreasing in both the number of workers that
lose their job at each point in time and the time it takes to find a new job.
The fact that  is strictly smaller than 1 implies that finding a job always
takes some time. Hence, the rate of unemployment is always strictly positive.
Workers are homogeneous, infinitely living and maximise the expected present
discounted value of utility with a discount rate of r > 0. Specifically, worker
j chooses consumption, cj, and labour supply, nj, so as to maximise
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U(cj, nj) + (1− )U(b+ pi, 0)
r
(1)
where b is real unemployment benefit and pi is real profit. As usual U(.)
is continuous, twice differentiable, concave, increasing in consumption and
decreasing in labour supply. The budget constraint if worker j is employed
is given by
cj = wnj + pi − tb (2)
where w is real wage and t := (1− )/.
Production takes place within firms. These may differ in size, i.e., in the
number of workers they employ. Otherwise they are identical. Labour is the
only input. The level of output produced by worker j, fj, is given by
fj = f(nj). (3)
The production function of a firm employing m > 0 workers is therefore
equal to
∑m
j=1 fj. (3) is continuous and the maximum amount of labour
worker j can supply is normalised to 1. Increasing returns to labour are
assumed over the relevant range, that is, ∂fj/∂nj > fj/nj > 0 ∀nj ∈
(0, 1]. This assumption implies one of the following scenarios: (1) increasing
marginal productivity of labour (i.e., ∂2fj/∂n
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j > 0); (2) constant marginal
productivity of labour and fixed costs of employment, such as insurance,
training, etc. (e.g., fj = αnj − v, α > v > 0); (3) decreasing marginal
productivity of labour and sufficiently large fixed costs of employment (e.g.,
fj = n
β
j − v, β ∈ (0, 1), v ∈ [1− β, 1))2.
The social optimum problem consists in finding a pair (nj,b) that maximises
individual utility. (1), (2), (3) and setting pi = 0 yield the following objective
function for the social planner
U(f(nj)− tb, nj) + (1− )U(b, 0) (4)
Define n∗ ∈ (0, 1) and b∗ ≥ 0 as the values of nj and b that maximise (4).
Assuming concavity of the objective function, n∗ and b∗ satisfy the following
two equations
2Under scenario (3), if the fixed costs are not large enough (e.g., fj = n
β
j − v, β ∈
(0, 1), v ∈ (0, 1 − β)), increasing returns to labour will arise only if nj ∈ (0, s), where
s < 1. In this case, the results of this paper are unaffected only if no equilibrium exists
where nj > s. One way to rule out equilibria where nj > s is to assume that the level of
wage individuals require to supply more than s units of labour is so large that firms would
make negative profits.
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U1(f(nj)− tb, nj)∂f(nj)
∂nj
+ U2(f(nj)− tb, nj) = 0 (5)
U1(f(nj)− tb, nj)− U1(b, 0) = 0 (6)
where Ui(.) denotes the derivative of U(.) with respect to its i-th argument.
We call the pair (n∗, b∗) the (socially) optimal allocation.
The market outcome differs. Define n˜j := n˜j(w) as the labour supply function
of individual j and φ(w, nj, b) as the first derivative of the expected utility
function (1) with respect to nj after insertion of the budget constraint, that
is
φ(w, nj, b) := U1(wnj + pi − tb, nj)w + U2(wnj + pi − tb, nj) (7)
Then, by the very definition of n˜j, the following must hold
φ(w, n˜j, b) = 0. (8)
As for the output market, as a benchmark we assume that competition among
firms ensures that goods are priced according to their average cost, so that
profit is zero3. Since workers are homogenous and, therefore, supply in equi-
librium the same amount of labour, the zero profit condition can be expressed
on each worker as
w =
f(nj)
nj
(9)
where nj is independent of j as all individuals are identical. To simplify the
analysis we make the following assumptions
Assumption 1 φ12φ1 − φ11φ2 ≤ 0 for nj = n˜j and ∀w > w, where w is
defined through U(wn˜j − tb, n˜j) = U(b, 0).
Assumption 2 Define θ := n3j∂
2fj/∂n
2
j − 2nj(nj∂fj/∂nj − fj). θ is contin-
uous and either θ 6= 0 ∀nj ∈ (0, 1] or θ = 0 ∀nj ∈ (0, 1].
Assumption 3 φ1 > 0 for all w > w.
Assumption 1 implies that n˜j is concave. From Assumption 2 follows that
the zero-profit curve (9) is either everywhere concave, everywhere convex or
linear. Assumption 3 states that j’s labour supply is increasing in wage. This
3The number of firms in the market is indeterminate as it depends on the firms’ sizes,
which can vary, and the total number of workers populating the economy.
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last assumption will be relaxed in section 7.
Assumptions 1 to 3 are pretty standard. Additively separable functions such
as cj − nγj , γ > 2, fulfill Assumptions 1 and 3. Assumption 2 applies to
Cobb-Douglas production functions and linear production functions with
fixed costs.
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that, ignoring the polar cases nj = 0 and nj = 1,
the economy has, in general, either zero, one, or two equilibria4. Given As-
sumption 3, in the latter case one equilibrium is stable and the other one is
not.
An example of the two equilibria case is depicted in Figure 1. Since all indi-
viduals are identical, the economy is fully described by the labour supply of
a single individual j and the zero-profit condition (9). S denotes j’s labour
supply, and corresponds therefore to n˜j, while T is the zero-profit curve (9).
The lower equilibrium, A, is unstable, while the higher one, B, is stable. To
see this, consider that for any point lying to the right (left) of the zero-profit
line firms make positive (negative) profit for every hired worker. So, there,
they increase (decrease) demand for labour causing real wage to rise (fall).
Similarly, j increases (reduces) her labour supply at any point to the left
(right) of her labour supply schedule.
The single equilibrium case can be obtained either by shifting S to the left
until it becomes tangent to T or by rotating it until one equilibrium van-
ishes. If j’s labour supply schedule lies completely above the zero-profit line,
no equilibrium exists.
Note that, wherever the economy is located in the real wage-labour supply
space, it always converges towards an equilibrium. In fact, given the direc-
tions of the adjustment process as represented by the arrows in Figure 1,
the economy, sooner or later, enters one of the regions labelled I, II, and III.
Once the economy is in one of these regions it will remain within it until
an equilibrium is reached. Specifically, if the economy is in II, it will move
within this area until it settles in B. The same applies when the economy is
in III. If, instead, the economy is in I, it stays in that region while moving
towards the nj = 0 equilibrium.
A and B correspond to different levels of individual labour supply not to
different levels of employment. In other words, in both A and B an equal
fraction  of the total workforce is employed. The difference is that in A each
employed individual works fewer hours than in B.
We conclude this section by pointing out that the market delivers a subop-
timal outcome as neither nA nor nB maximise individual utility U(f(nj) −
4Equilibria are more than two only if for some interval labour supply schedule and
zero-profit curve coincide. In this case the number of equilibria is infinite.
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tb∗, nj). In fact, both nA and nB satisfy
U1(f(nj)− tb∗, nj)f(nj)
nj
+ U2(f(nj)− tb∗, nj) = 0 (10)
under the participation constraint
U(f(nj)− tb∗, nj) ≥ U(b∗, 0) (11)
The left-hand-side of (10) is always smaller than the left-hand-side of (5), so
that neither nA nor nB can be a solution of (5). Finally, concavity of (4)
implies that n∗ lies to the right of nB, that is, n∗ ∈ (nB, 1).
nA nB
wB
nj
S
B
III
T
w
I
A
wA
II
Figure 1: Market equilibrium
3 Job competition
In this section we relax the implicit assumption that workers cannot affect
their probability of becoming unemployed. Specifically, we assume that,
because of increasing returns, firms rank employees according to the level
of labour they supply. This means that worker j can raise her individual
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expected utility by expanding her relative level of labour supply. By doing
so she enjoys three benefits: firstly, she reduces any management’s incentive
to replace her with a new employee5; secondly, she reduces the probability of
being laid-off in case of downsizing; thirdly, she lowers the production costs of
the firm she is working for thereby reducing the probability of liquidation and
job loss. We argue therefore that a rat race takes place among workers, each
of them trying to lower their expected unemployment spells by supplying
more labour than other workers do. We shall denote this process as job
competition. Job competition implies a change in worker j expected utility
function (1). This takes now the following form
ΩρjU(cj, nj) + (1− Ωρj )U(b+ pi, 0)
r
(12)
Ωj is a continuous, twice differentiable function of nj and n−j, where the latter
denotes labour supply of all workers except j and, like nj, is bounded between
0 and 1. So, Ωj := Ω (nj, n−j) and n−j ∈ [0, 1]. Ωj has the following charac-
teristics: Ωρj ∈ (0, 1 ] ∀nj ∈ [0, 1] and ∀n−j ∈ [0, 1]; Ωj(v, v) = 1 ∀v ∈ [0, 1];
∂Ωj/∂nj > 0 and ∂Ωj/∂n−j < 0.
The parameter ρ accounts for the level of job competition. The larger is ρ
the higher is the impact of Ωj on j’s expected utility function. ρ = 0 implies
that there is no competition for jobs.
Insert (2) into (12) and assume that the resulting expression is concave in
j’s labour supply and that worker j maximises it taking n−j as given. Then,
optimal labour supply of individual j must satisfy the following condition
ρψ(w, nj, n−j, b) + φ(w, nj, b) = 0 (13)
where
ψ(w, nj, n−j, b) :=
∂Ωj(nj, n−j)
∂nj
[U (wnj − tb+ pi, nj)− U(b+ pi, 0)]
Ωj(nj, n−j)
(14)
A comparison between (13) and (8) makes clear that, for every level of real
wage and every level of labour supplied by the other workers, individual j,
in general, supplies more labour than under no job competition. In fact,
ψ(w, nj, n−j, b) is non-negative, so that (13) implies φ(w, nj, b) ≤ 0. Job
competition has no impact on j’s labour supply only when the participation
constraint is binding. In this case, workers are indifferent between the two
states, employed and unemployed, and have therefore no reason to compete
5The more labour a given individual supplies, the less likely is that anyone replacing
her will supply a larger amount of labour.
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for jobs. As a result, ψ(w, nj, n−j, b) becomes equal to zero and (13) collapses
to (8).
So, if ρ > 0 and the participation constraint is slack, j’s labour supply in
Figure 1 shifts to the right. Hence, if there are equilibria, they must lie either
to the right of nB or to the left of nA, i.e., the market can in principle attain
the optimal allocation n∗. Further, the following proposition holds
Proposition 1 Define nˆj := nˆj (ρ, w, n−j) as j’s labour supply (and, there-
fore, the solution to (13))6. Then
dnˆj
dρ
> 0 ∀ρ ≥ 0, ∀n−j ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 1 stems from the fact that (12) is concave. In order to have a
fairly well-shaped labour supply schedule we extend Assumption 1 to the job
competition case. So
Assumption 4 (ρψ12 + φ12) (ρψ1 + φ1)− (ρψ11 + φ11) (ρψ2 + φ2) ≤ 0
for nj = nˆj, ∀w > w, ∀ρ ≥ 0, and ∀n−j ∈ [0, 1].
Analog to Assumption 1, Assumption 4 ensures that j’s labour supply is
concave for each level of job competition and each level of labour supplied by
the other individuals. As for the relationship between nˆj and w, the following
proposition holds
Proposition 2
dnˆj
dw
> 0 ∀ρ ≥ 0, ∀n−j ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 2 states that labour supply is upward-sloping. In fact, from total
differentiation of j’s optimality condition (13) follows that the sign of dnˆj/dw
is equal to the sign of
ρψ1 + φ1 (15)
Since ψ1 > 0, ρ ≥ 0, and, given Assumption 3, φ1 > 0, (15) is always positive
and so is dnˆj/dw. Hence, labour supply is increasing under job competition
as it is in the absence of it.
Having derived the relationship between nˆj and ρ and between nˆj and w,
we now discuss the impact of other workers’ labour supply on nˆj. Total
differentiation of (13) yields the following proposition
6Hence, nˆj (0, w, n−j) = n˜j(w).
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Proposition 3
sign
[
dnˆj
dn−j
]
= sign
[
Ωj
∂2Ωj
∂nj∂n−j
− ∂Ωj
∂nj
∂Ωj
∂n−j
]
.
So, depending on the characteristics of Ωj, nˆj either increases, decreases, or
remains unchanged in response to a rise in n−j. The first case corresponds
to assuming strategic complementarities while the second one implies the
existence of strategic substitutabilities 7.
Individual labour supply under job competition can be depicted as in Figure
2. The solid lines correspond to those of Figure 1. Each dotted line can be
interpreted as j’s labour supply for some given combination of ρ and n−j.
In particular, if we keep n−j constant and vary ρ, we obtain for every level
of job competition a different labour supply curve, whereby the higher is
ρ, the more rightward lies the supply curve. The same applies if, instead
of ρ, n−j is varied. In this case, however, the more external curves do not
correspond necessarily to a higher n−j. For this to be the case we need
to assume strategic complementarities (dnˆj/dn−j > 0). On the contrary,
j’s labour supply at each real wage would decrease after a rise in n−j in
the presence of strategic substitutabilities (dnˆj/dn−j < 0). So, all curves
lying to the right of S in Figure 2 can be interpreted in two different ways.
Either they reflect different levels of job competition at a given n−j, in which
case the more outward is a curve, the higher is ρ. Or they correspond to
different levels of n−j for a given ρ, in which case a more outward schedule
implies a larger n−j under strategic complementarities and a smaller n−j
under strategic substitutabilities.
Notably, the parameter  affects j’s labour supply only via the tax rate t.
Still, it plays a crucial role in the model as the fact that  is smaller than one
implies that the labour market is unable to instantaneously match every job
seeker with a vacancy. And this is sufficient to give rise to job competition.
4 Equilibrium analysis
The equilibrium analysis follows the lines of the discussion carried out in
section 2 for the no-job competition case. Since all workers are identical,
their objective functions are concave and there is a common single wage,
only symmetric equilibria can arise. That is, in equilibrium, all individuals
supply the same amount of labour so that nˆj = n−j must hold.
If nˆj is independent of n−j, the results are qualitatively the same as in the
7See Cooper and John [7].
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wA
nA nj
Sk
A
B
E
D
S
T
w
F
Figure 2: Labour supply with and without job competition
no-job competition case as for every ρ there is a unique labour supply. So, for
any given ρ, there are still at most two equilibria. One equilibrium belongs
to L := [0, nA] and is unstable and the other one belongs to H := [nB, 1]
and is stable. For ρ = 0, the high equilibrium corresponds to nB and the
low equilibrium to nA. As ρ is increased, j’s labour supply shifts outwards
so that the low equilibrium moves towards the lower bound of L while the
high equilibrium moves towards the upper bound of H.
If nˆj is instead a function of n−j, the location of j’s labour supply depends
on both ρ and n−j. In this case all possible equilibria still belong to either
L or H. However, for each value of ρ, there are potentially infinite different
equilibria. In fact, for any given ρ, the optimality condition (13) allows for
an unbounded number of symmetric solutions.
Like in the no-job competition case and whatever the relationship between nˆj
and n−j, the system always converges towards an equilibrium. The argument
is the same used in section 2. That is, wherever the economy is located,
sooner or later, it moves into one of the regions labelled I, II, and III in
Figure 1. And from there to an equilibrium. The only difference is that, if
nˆj depends on n−j, the boundary of these regions represented by j’s labour
supply moves inwards and outwards while the economy adjusts towards an
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equilibrium. The same argument can be exploited to predict the effect of
a change in ρ even without knowing the relationship between nˆj and n−j.
Specifically
Proposition 4 The impact of a change in ρ depends on where the economy
is located at the time of the change. In particular
(a) if at any equilibrium level of nj in L ρ is increased (decreased), the
economy converges towards a new equilibrium in H (nj = 0);
(b) if at any equilibrium level of nj in H ρ is increased (decreased), the
economy converges towards a new equilibrium in H characterised by a
larger (smaller) individual labour supply.
So, whether there are strategic complementarities, substitutabilities or nˆj is
independent of n−j is irrelevant when it comes to determine the effect of
an increase in ρ. To see this and why Proposition 4 holds, consider Figure
2. Suppose that the economy is in equilibrium at A. If we increase ρ, j’s
labour supply schedule shifts to the right, for example to Sk. At the current
wage, wA, j as well as all other individuals increase their labour supply,
firms make positive profit, and real wage starts to rise. The economy moves
therefore inside the region labelled II in Figure 1 and will stay there until
a new equilibrium has been reached in H. Since all individuals increase
their labour supply, n−j rises in the process. If nˆj is independent of n−j,
the economy will settle at D on Sk. However, if nˆj is increasing in n−j
(strategic complementarities), j’s labour supply will move outwards during
the adjustment process and the economy will settle somewhere to the right
of D, for example in F. By contrast, if nˆj is decreasing in n−j (strategic
substitutabilities), j’s labour supply will move inwards during the adjustment
process and the economy will settle somewhere to the left of D, for example,
in E. If the economy actually settles in E and ρ is decreased, j’s labour supply
shifts to the left and the economy moves into the region labelled III in Figure
1. And from there to a new equilibrium between B and E.
A similar reasoning can be applied to any equilibrium point in L and H
and leads to the results summarised in Proposition 4. So, the difference
between strategic complementarities and strategic substitutabilities is that
the former exacerbate the impact of an increase in job competition while the
latter dampen it.
Finally, there is a unique value of ρ that is compatible with the optimal
allocation (n∗, b∗). This value is denoted by ρ and is given by
ρ = −
φ
(
f(n∗)
n∗ , n
∗, b∗
)
ψ (n∗, n∗, b∗)
. (16)
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(16) is derived from (13) and (9) and does not require either Assumption 3
or Assumption 4. Given the definition of ψ (see (14)), (16) implies that ρ is
decreasing in the gap between the utility of holding a job and that of being
unemployed. This is because the larger is the loss of utility associated with
becoming unemployed, the keener are workers to retain their jobs. Hence,
the larger the amount of labour they are willing to supply. Since labour
supply is positively correlated to ρ (see Proposition 1), any increase in the
difference between the utility of holding a job and that of being unemployed
must be matched by a decrease in job competition if labour supply is to be
kept unchanged.
Note that setting ρ = ρmay not be sufficient to achieve the optimal allocation
as equilibria different from n∗ could emerge. In fact, the right-hand-side of
(16) may be equal to ρ for values of nj and n−j different from n∗. However,
if nˆj is independent of n−j, n∗ is the only stable equilibrium compatible with
ρ.
5 Product market competition and job com-
petition
This section discusses the relationship between job competition and product
market competition. We assume that, due to output market imperfections,
in equilibrium profits are strictly positive. In particular, firms are assumed
to price their output at the constant mark-up 1/λ, λ ∈ (0, 1], over the av-
erage cost of production8. The smaller is λ, the larger is the mark-up and
the higher is firms’ market power. λ = 1 corresponds to the case we have
considered so far, i.e., the one in which firms have no market power. λ is
to be interpreted as a measure of product market competition: the larger is
λ, the more competitive is the product market. The mark-up rule implies a
profit share of 1− λ (hence, more competition means less profit) and yields
the following real wage equation
w = λ
f(nj)
nj
(17)
(17) nests as a special case the zero-profit curve (9) and yields, in the real
wage-labour supply space, a different constant-profit schedule for each λ.
8One possible way to justify this pricing rule is to assume collusion among incumbent
firms and a shadow cost of entry proportional to output. This latter assumption is used
by Blanchard and Giavazzi [5] to derive the long-run equilibrium of a monopolistically
competitive economy in which firms make positive profits.
14
Specifically, as λ decreases, the constant-profit curve shifts to the right
lowering wage for each given amount of worked hours. This means that
lowering/raising product market competition has the same effect as lower-
ing/raising job competition. In fact, shifting the constant-profit schedule
outwards is the same as shifting the labour supply curve inwards. So
Proposition 5 At any equilibrium point, a change in λ has the same qual-
itative effect of a change in ρ (see Proposition 4).
Although the impact on nj is qualitatively the same whether we change ρ
or λ, the income distribution effects are different. In fact, an increase in
λ reduces the profit share in the economy. By contrast, a rise in ρ leaves
the profit share unchanged. Since in both cases production increases, firms
strictly prefer a rise in ρ to a rise in λ, while workers’ preferences are the
opposite. We illustrate this point by means of Figure 3.
Suppose the economy is in equilibrium at Q and, for simplicity, that j’s
labour supply depends only on w and ρ. The social planner can achieve
the optimal allocation n∗ either by increasing job competition9 or by raising
product market competition. In the former case, j’s labour supply shifts from
S1 to S2 and the economy ends up in Z. In the latter case, the constant-profit
line shifts from T 1 to T 2 and the economy settles in V. Although both V
and Z are consistent with the optimal allocation n∗, they entail a different
income distribution. In fact, the profit share, 1− λ, is larger in Z than in V.
Hence, firms prefer Z, while workers prefer V.
Proposition 5 and the example of Figure 3 suggest a negative relationship
between the value of ρ compatible with the optimal allocation (n∗, b∗) and the
degree of product market competition. And this is indeed the case. When
the output market is not perfectly competitive, the optimal value of ρ, that
is, the only value ρ∗ consistent with the optimal allocation, is given by
ρ∗ = −
φ
(
λf(n
∗)
n∗ , n
∗, b′
)
ψ (n∗, n∗, b′)
. (18)
where b′ := b∗ − pi = b∗ − (1 − λ)f(nj). Clearly, when λ = 1, ρ∗ = ρ.
Like in the case of a perfectly competitive output market, setting ρ equal to
its optimal value is not sufficient to ensure that the economy will converge
towards n∗, as multiple equilibria can exist for the same value of ρ.
As expected, dρ∗/dλ < 0. That is, there is a negative correlation between the
9One way the social planner may affect ρ is through labour market regulation. For
example, reducing hiring/firing costs may raise job competition as it makes it easier for
firms to lay off/recruit workers.
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Figure 3: Job competition and product market competition
optimal level of job competition and the degree of product market competi-
tion. The reason is that an increase in λ raises real wage inducing individuals
to supply more labour. To offset this effect a decrease in job competition is
therefore necessary. So, if the economy has reached the optimal allocation,
an increase in either job or output market competition lowers welfare. Hence,
the relationship between output market competition and welfare can be neg-
ative.
6 A special case
In this section we present an example. Assume that utility and production
functions take on the following form
U(cj, nj) = cj −
nγj
γ
(19)
fj = Z
nαj
α
(20)
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with γ > 2, α > 1, γ > α and Z ∈ (0, 1). The socially optimal level of
individual labour supply is
n∗ = Z
1
γ−α (21)
Since (6) is met for every level of b, there is no specific optimal level of
employment compensation. The zero-profit market outcome is expressed by
n˜ =
(
Z
α
) 1
γ−α
< n∗ (22)
that is, the market outcome is suboptimal.
Let us now introduce job competition and assume that Ωj takes on the fol-
lowing form
Ωj =
 (nj/n−j)
ρ if nj ≤ (1/)1/ρn−j
1/ otherwise
(23)
Then there are neither strategic complementarities nor strategic substitutabil-
ities, i.e., dnˆj/dn−j = 0. So, for each ρ, there is only one labour supply curve.
Moreover, for each degree of job competition, there is only one market equi-
librium.
The level of job competition that leads to the optimal allocation is given by
ρ∗ =
(
1− λ
α
)/(
λ
α
− 1
γ
− b

Z
γ
α−γ
)
> 0 (24)
and setting ρ = ρ∗ is a sufficient condition to achieve the optimal allocation.
It is easy to see that the following inequalities hold
∂ρ∗
∂b
> 0
∂ρ∗
∂Z
< 0
∂ρ∗
∂λ
< 0
∂ρ∗
∂
< 0
i.e., ρ∗ is increasing in b and decreasing in A, λ, and .
The negative relationship between job and product market competition is
consistent with Proposition 4 and 5. These state that an increase/decrease
in either λ or ρ raises/lowers the activity level. Hence, if the latter is at
its social optimum, a rise in λ must be accompanied by a decrease in ρ and
vice-versa. The economic intuition behind the other results is as follows.
The optimal level of job competition is increasing in b because an increase
in unemployment compensation reduces the difference between the employed
workers’ utility and that of those receiving benefits. Individuals are therefore
induced to restrict their labour supply.
On the contrary, the larger is Z, i.e., the more productive is labour, the
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smaller should be competition for jobs. In fact, the more productive is labour,
the smaller is the relative size of the tax burden (tb) for employed individuals
and the larger is the gap between their utility and that of those who are
unemployed.
Finally, the optimal level of job competition increases when  falls. This
means that an increase in expected unemployment (a reduction in ) leads
unambiguously to a decrease in labour supply. The reason is that the only
effect of a decrease in  is an increase in taxation to finance unemployment
benefits and, therefore, a reduction in the employed workers’ utility. Being
employed becomes consequently less attractive and the social planner must
increase competition for jobs to avoid a fall in the level of activity10.
Note that since there is no specific optimal level of unemployment benefits,
the social planner has an additional degree of freedom. That is, even if ρ
were fixed, an optimal allocation could still be attainable by choosing the
appropriate level of unemployment compensation.
7 Backward-bending labour supply
In this section we relax Assumption 3 and suppose instead that, in the ab-
sence of job competition, labour supply bends backwards once a certain level
of real wage w˜ is reached. This case is depicted in Figure 4. Like A in Figure
1, A1 is unstable. However, unlike B, B1 may not be stable either. In fact,
if the economy is out of equilibrium, it will not necessarily converge. Specif-
ically, unlike in the upward-sloping labour supply case, if the economy is in
either II or III, it does not necessarily stay within these regions. Instead, it
may keep moving inside and outside of them and around B1 (or even possibly
towards A1) without ever converging to an equilibrium.
While Proposition 1 is unaffected by the relaxation of Assumption 3 (labour
supply increases in ρ independently of its shape), Proposition 2 no longer
holds. In fact, for w > w˜, φ1 is negative so that (15) turns out to be negative
for low values of ρ. In particular, there is a value of ρ, ρ˜ := −φ1/ψ1, such
that, if w > w˜, j’s labour supply is increasing in wage if ρ > ρ˜ and is
decreasing otherwise. This means that if under no-job competition labour
supply is decreasing in w, it may be increasing when individuals compete for
10This somehow counterintuitive result hinges crucially on the assumption that ρ is in-
dependent of . Nevertheless, it may seem reasonable to assume that when the probability
of being unemployed increases, competition for jobs becomes fiercer. This is equivalent to
say that a decrease in  has a positive direct impact on ρ. If this is true, a fall in  leads
ceteris paribus to more job competition and possibly to a larger labour supply. In this
case the social planner would have to take measures apt to reduce the level of competition
for jobs.
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Figure 4: The backward-bending labour supply case
jobs (see Figure 5). Hence, econometric tests showing a positive elasticity
of labour supply may be misleading, as the true relationship between labour
supply and wage may well be negative11.
Proposition 3 maintains its validity while most of Proposition 4 applies only
in the short term. In fact, while the immediate effect of a change in ρ is
the one described in Proposition 4, the long term impact is in most cases
unknown. Specifically, the only statement that can be made is that if the
economy is in equilibrium in L, a decrease in ρ moves it towards a lower
equilibrium.
As for Proposition 5, whether the effects of a change in job competition and
of a change in product market competition are the same depends on where
the economy is located. Specifically, the short term impact of a change in λ is
the same as the one caused by a change in ρ if the economy is in equilibrium
in L, while it is the opposite if the economy is in equilibrium in H. In the
latter case, the short term effect of a reduction (increase) in λ is an increase
(reduction) in labour supply while the immediate effect of a reduction (in-
crease) in ρ is a fall (rise) in labour supply. The long term effect of a change
11For estimates of labour supply elasticities see Ashenfelter and Card [2].
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in product market competition is instead ambiguous unless the change con-
sists in a reduction in λ that occurs when the economy is in equilibrium in
L. In this case, the economy converges towards a lower equilibrium level of
activity.
Finally, for each level of product market competition there is still a unique
degree of job competition that is consistent with the optimal allocation. How-
ever, the optimal degree of job competition is now increasing in λ. In fact,
since at the social optimum both φ and φ1 are negative, the right hand side
of (18) is increasing in λ so that ρ∗ rises when product market competition
is increased instead of decreasing as it was the case when labour supply was
upward-sloping. The economic explanation mirrors the one given under As-
sumption 3 (see end of section 5). The difference is that now an increase
in real wage induces a reduction instead of an expansion in labour supply.
Hence, more, not less, job competition is needed to compensate for the effect
of an increase in λ.
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8 Conclusion
Empirical studies have highlighted two stylised facts: first, individual labour
supply has increased in many industrialised countries; second, individuals do
not seem to locate on their labour supply schedule, in the sense that they
work more hours than they would like to at the offered wage. This paper
has provided a model that is consistent with this empirical evidence. The
model makes two key assumptions: first, there is frictional unemployment
and, second, there are increasing returns to labour. These two assumptions
imply that individuals compete for jobs. Specifically, in order to reduce their
probability of being laid-off, individuals expand their labour supply above the
level which would be consistent with their preferences. We established that
there is a unique strictly positive level of job competition that is compatible
with the optimal allocation. If labour supply is upward sloping, an increase
(reduction) in either job or product market competition raises (lowers) the
equilibrium level of labour supply. Hence, if labour supply exceeds its optimal
level, lowering competition in either the product or the job market raises
welfare. Finally, the socially optimal allocation is consistent with infinite
combinations of the degrees of job and product market competition. Each of
such combinations implies a different income distribution.
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